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Abstract 
This Conceptual paper proposes a framework for non-violent conflict resolution for Zimbabwe. It argues 
that non-violent action is the only viable option available to address conflict situations. The option has potential 
to bring better results and success than the violent option. The key source of power of nonviolent action is the 
local people and the cooperation of different stakeholders. People power and civilian-based resistance help 
legitimise the change process and the government that emerges out of the process stays in power longer. The 
assumption is that if people carry out the action long enough and in sufficient numbers it will lead to an 
oppressive government becoming powerless and receding. The paper argues that nonviolent action is not 
spontaneous but follows periods of strategic planning. Plans on how to respond to the oppressor’s reaction need 
to be developed. So too should the non-violent movement know its resource base and how it is going to mobilise 
people to take part. Non-violent action needs to be accompanied with strong strategic thinking and 
communication skills. It also requires a lot of community mobilisation and training. Ordinary citizens need to be 
skilled on how to act non-violently when faced up with a violent reaction to their demands.    
Key Words: conflict, non-violent action, oppressive government, strategic planning, government.   
 
1. Background on Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is a land locked country located in Southern Africa with a population of approximately 13 
million people. It is a young country with an estimated 62% of its population aged below 35 years. It is also 
estimated that at least three million Zimbabweans are located in the Diaspora – a key development linked to the 
country’s conflicts.  
Zimbabwe gained her political independence from British colonial rule in 1980. Since then it has adopted a 
multi-party system. Between 1980 and 1987 there were two main political parties that were historically linked to 
the liberation struggle, ZANU (PF)1 and ZAPU2. The two parties merged in 1987 into an entity under ZANU 
(PF). The plan by President Mugabe to have a one-party by 1990 was met with heavy criticism from different 
stakeholders. Zimbabwe’s political landscape has been dominated by ZANU (PF), which has won all the 
elections that have been held in Zimbabwe since independence. However, the legitimacy of these elections has 
been questioned by the opposition amidst accusations of electoral fraud, rigging and voter intimidation. Many 
opposition political parties have been formed since the setting up of the short-lived Zimbabwe Unity Movement 
(ZUM), which contested the 1990 elections. Zimbabwe’s main opposition party was the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) that was formed in 1999. The party went on to split into Movement for Democratic 
Change - Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic Change – Ncube (MDC-N) in 2005. There have 
been incidences of political violence in most of the elections held in Zimbabwe. The worst occurrence took place 
during the re-run of the Presidential Elections in 2008.  The disputed 2008 elections put the Zimbabwean crisis 
on the limelight and led to the formation of a transitional Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU was 
constituted from Zimbabwe’s three main political parties, namely ZANU (PF), MDC-T and MDC-N. 
Zimbabwe’s constitution adopted at independence was amended a record 19 times before the adoption of a new 
one in 2013.  
Zimbabwe is an agro-based economy and the country was once dubbed the “Bread basket of Southern 
Africa”. Other major industries that have contributed to the country’s economy have been the manufacturing and 
tourism sectors. Zimbabwe took over a well-structured economy that performed well from independence but 
took a bad turn on the “Black Friday” of 14 November 1997 when the local currency plunged 72%. Between 
1991 and 2000 the country adopted a number of unsuccessful economic adjustment programs which were meant 
to revive Zimbabwe’s failing economy and ensure access multi-lateral loans (Brett 2005; Mlambo and 
Raftopoulos 2010). However the outcome of these liberalisation programs was industry closures and high job 
losses. From 1999 Zimbabwe started to default on its loan repayments with multi-lateral institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The turn of the 21st century witnessed the continued 
plunge of Zimbabwe’s economy standing culminating to record breaking hyper-inflationary period that ended in 
early 2009 (Kairiza 2009; Jones 2010). The hyper-inflation was not halted as a result of an economic turn-around 
or astute policy formulation. It was rather a result of the total abandonment of the local currency and the 
                                                 
1
 Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)  
2
 Zimbabwe African People's Union – Led by Joshua N. Nkomo 
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adoption of a multi-currency regime. Present day Zimbabwe has an industry that is operating at below 30% 
capacity, an informal small businesses and high levels of poverty.  
In the 1980s the conflict in Zimbabwe was mainly political, punctuated by human rights violations and 
suspicions of treason and assassination attempts. The Entumbane uprisings of 1981 and the discovery of arms 
caches in 1982 triggered a series of conflicts. These included the unleashing of the Fifth Brigade, under an 
operation named Gukurahundi, in the predominantly Ndebele regions and the dissident killings that took place in 
the Midlands and Matabeleland Provinces (Ngwenya 2014). Political violence reared its ugly head prior to the 
1985 elections and there have been politically related killings since then. The deadliest experience was during 
the 2008 elections where there are more than 167 documented deaths and thousands of abductions. Violent and 
deadly land grabs took place in 2000 after a referendum rejected a draft constitution that would have legalised 
the compulsory uncompensated acquisition of white owned farms. This was also coupled with forced take-overs 
of a number of white owned businesses and industries.  
 
2. Unpacking the social and economic injustice in Zimbabwe  
Strategizing for a non-violent action entails the application of integrative thinking, which enables the 
strategist to see the conflict in totality, embrace its multi-varied nature and understand the complexity of its 
causal relationships (Johnson, 2007). We will apply a systems approach for us to unpack Zimbabwe’s social and 
economic injustice conflict. Systems thinking allows us to make sense of the messy world we live in (Williams 
and Hummelbrunner, 2010a). Human behaviour is not linear but is explained by intertwined action. Thus by 
applying casual loop modelling we can explore non-linear interrelationships and understand dynamic interlinked 
situations (Williams and Hummelbrunner, 2010b). Figure 1, below, is a casual loop diagram that helps us unpack 
the Zimbabwean conflict and identify key variables that can possibly be transformed through nonviolent action.  
We were able to single out three key variables that characterise the ongoing social and economic injustice 
prevailing in the country at the moment. These are: 
 
(i) dictatorship;  
(ii) rights abuse which is linked to the rule of law; and 
(iii) economic performance which is linked to corruption and policy inconsistency. 
 
It is important to point out that for an increase in the application of this alternative, in Zimbabwe’s context, 
the first step will be to ensure that the civilians’ economic livelihoods are well supported. The civilians should 
have a reliable and independent source of income that makes it easy for them to boycott certain businesses or 
services when called upon to do so. They should be put in a position where giving up a day or a week of their 
daily activities becomes an easy and worthy option to pursue. If people are fixated on how to make it through a 
day their chances of voluntarily taking part in any form of resistance become less and less. 
 
3. Designing strategies for key contributors to the conflict 
Strategic planning is very central in the implementation of nonviolent strategies. There has to be a proper 
understanding of underlying factors before calls for crucial reforms like these ones are initiated. A great deal of 
time should be spent on this crucial exercise. Key partners need to be identified well ahead of time. Those 
involved in the exercise should be well versed in the subject they will be dealing with, rather than exposing 
themselves and the initiative. Due to the complexities associated with the Zimbabwean issue, emphasis should be 
highlighted on these given nonviolent actions. 
The first step to success in any nonviolent campaign is clearly articulated goals/objectives (Helvey 2004). 
These goals must be unanimous, achievable and must consider the strengths and weaknesses of the opponents. 
The goals help streamline, guide and secure the activities and interest of the supporters. Once the goal(s) have 
been set, we must proceed to select the appropriate strategies however, it is important to consider the context in 
which it would be applied. Strategies are very important to nonviolent struggles because it involves a detailed 
articulation of the actions that would be executed in order to achieve the goals and objectives of the struggle. 
Nonviolent methods must be evaluated in terms of goals, effectiveness, legitimacy and appropriateness in order 
to achieve success. In this light, a prospective nonviolent Zimbabwe should be designed and implemented along 
the theme of installing a true democratic leadership in the country. 
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Figure 1 Causal Loop Diagram of Zimbabwe's conflict 
 
4. Totalitarianism and electoral reforms 
Summarily, a strategic nonviolent approach to reverse the Zimbabwe situation would involve the following 
objectives:  
 
(i) To get rid of oppressive systems of governance and replace it with a more inclusive kind where 
structural inequalities and injustices are reduced to the nearest minimal Strategy: To sensitize the 
populace on their electoral rights and monitor electoral procedures. Tactics: To place 
representatives at every polling unit to monitor elections.  
(ii) To employ appropriate acts of civil resistance like; protest and marches if the election results are 
compromised to favour the oppressor. 
 
A prospective nonviolent strategy for the Zimbabwe crisis could be focused on the forth-coming elections in 
2018. This period was selected because it provides the right political situation and popular mood required to 
topple this administration. Furthermore, Elections period good platforms for oppositions to set out clear 
achievable objectives within the timeline of the election period. Nonviolent overthrow of dictatorial 
administrations through election as displayed in the Philippines and Serbia are typical demonstration of the 
strength of electoral processes in nonviolent struggles. The United States Institute of Peace (2002) notes two 
areas that must be put into consideration by the opposition in order to attain democratic freedom through 
elections this include; the ability to press for free and fair elections and the involvement of external factors in 
pressuring incumbent to respect the decisions of the electorates’. This was confirmed in the Ukrainian Orange 
revolution where the presence of external observers aided the transparency of the final election results which 
invariably led to the disposition of the incumbent.  
The preparatory stage is a crucial component of a nonviolent strategy that must not be overlooked in order to 
achieve successful democratic revolution especially in a country like Zimbabwe where years of political 
repression have had devastating effects on the political climate of the country with evidential effects on the 
reluctance of people to participate in political activities. In this light, an important element of the change process 
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would be for the leaders of opposition groups and other parties desiring change to come together to form a 
formidable force that can challenge the oppressor. The parties must be unified to form a strong and credible 
coalition that would garner massive support from internal and external parties. They must be bound by a 
common theme or goal and should resolve to exclude the use of violence in their activities. Lowenthal and Bitar 
(2015) further explain that political leaders must build the capacity of their coalitions by reconciling or 
obliterating groups with divergent agendas that may pose a risk to the attainment of set goals and objectives.  
This coalition should also be extended to include social movement groups and professionals like Human 
rights groups, students, labour unions, religious groups amongst others. Specific attention should be given to 
including religious leaders into the coalition because of the crucial role religious figures have played in the 
transition to inclusive governments in other parts of the world.  
Similarly, the cultivation of core democratic knowledge and skills crucial to the achievement of a successful 
transition must be encouraged at all levels. This is important because of the debilitating structures inherent in the 
educational system of Zimbabwe which Matereke (2012: 196) says is responsible for the political polarisation 
existing in the country. According to him, the lack of a pluralistic education in Zimbabwe has permitted the 
growth of blind patriotism which is inimical to the development of true democracy thereby underscoring the 
importance of aggressive citizenship education in Zimbabwe. The citizens must be sensitized on the dynamics of 
the nonviolent action particularly the nature and need for the strategies and the agenda of the oppressor. Ettang 
(2014: 416) notes: 
 
Training the public on the nature, impact and value of nonviolence is also important in preparing them for 
nonviolent action. Members of nonviolent movements or individuals taking part in a specific nonviolent 
action must understand the issues and the reasons for which they are embarking on this struggle. 
 
Training of leaders for nonviolent transitions in governance should be decentralised and modelled after the 
trainings that took place during the Serbian revolution of 2000. In Zimbabwe, this is relevant because of the 
existing climate of political oppression which has made overt training of nonviolent leaders difficult. Hence the 
need to adopt a grassroots training approach which would help groom a large population of leaders and also 
utilise information technologies like internet, mobile phones amongst others.  
Clear communication is also an important feature of successful revolutions, there must be a clear and 
consistent pattern of disseminating information between the supporters and also between the supporters and the 
oppressors. Supporters of the revolution must have a clear understanding of the goals and objectives of their 
struggles and must be able to articulate it to other people especially external parties. In the case of Zimbabwe, 
activist must be in close contact with external parties especially non-state pro-democratic actors. This would 
enable them mobilise human and material resources for their course.  
It is well known that a deep knowledge of the opposition’s weaknesses is crucial to the success of nonviolent 
resistance. In Zimbabwe, the consequences of poor economic policies are evident in the underdevelopment and 
poverty levels of the country thereby leading to gross dissatisfaction with the present administration as Moore 
(2012) confirmed that over half of the population of Zimbabweans have lost faith in the ruling party. In light of 
this fact, the opposition should project these weaknesses and push for a change of government. Consequently, 
enlightenments and campaigns should be structured in way that articulates the objectives of the struggle which is 
to eliminate every form of structural injustices and inequalities in the society.  
In preparation for the elections, plans must be made to ensure that the electoral processes are monitored 
closely to eradicate all forms of irregularities and trends that have been observed in previous elections where the 
incumbent manipulated electoral processes to secure their access to power. Helvey (2004: 31) recalled the 
conduct of the Mugabe-led Government during the 2002 elections where it used state resources and power to 
intimidate opposition party members and thwart election procedures and results. He therefore called for a well 
thought out Plan B by the opposition party in order to achieve full democratic transition.  
The lesson here is that elections are too important to the regime to lose since that defeat would mean the loss 
of legitimacy both at home and in the international community.  For the same reasons, elections are also too 
important for the democratic opposition to lose. Preparations should be made to insure that the public is prepared 
to validate their votes at the ballot box with carefully planned measures to thwart the regime’s efforts to rig the 
results 
 
5. Human rights abuse and security sector reforms 
Security Sector Reform is a concept that gained consideration as a development agenda in the aftermath of 
the cold war (Muller 2014). It refers to a host of reform interventions related to the reform of sections of the 
public sector engaged in the provision of both internal and external security (Nyakudya 2014: 1). These include 
the defence forces, intelligence services, police, the judiciary and the prison service. These reforms aim at 
providing operative state and human security through democratic governance, respect for the rule of law and 
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human rights. It is unfortunate that the Zimbabwean government have labelled the reforms as an orchestrated 
Western manoeuvre aimed at effecting regime change in the country. As such, the attempt will be prone to 
resistance from all government corners.  
The call for these reforms has been associated with the regime change agenda in this country. Any attempt to 
transform the security sector in Zimbabwe is perceived as a cover for regime change since the regime change 
was the overtly stated policy objective of several western governments with regard to Zimbabwe. Any efforts by 
anyone, even Zimbabweans to address the issues of governance or modernization in the security sector 
legitimately are denounced as collaboration with the hostile Western agenda aimed at undermining the 
independence and sovereignty of Zimbabwe (Muller 2014). The other misconception was that politicians across 
the divide and some elements in the donor community were complicating the situation by publicly stating that 
security reforms were only, and all, about reforming state security provision (Zimbabwe Peace and Security 
Programme 2015: 3). So these unguided misconceptions, speak of the need to first educate the people, politicians, 
and even the donor community that the security sector reforms are more encompassing and broad in their 
approach to the subject in question. Zimbabwe's security minister also joined the president of the country in 
openly rejecting out of hand any reforms of the security apparatus; in one of his addresses to the media, he stated 
that "security sector reform is a project by the country's enemies who want to weaken the state… This is a mere 
project to destabilize the country and it is not acceptable" (Muller 2014: 3).  
The dynamics of the security sector in Zimbabwe are complex. As Hendricks and Hutton (2009) put it, there 
is the interplay between the inherited ‘colonial institutional heritage' and ‘the liberation culture that gave birth to 
Zimbabwe'. The evolution of Zimbabwe as a nation has been punctuated by epochs of inter-related violent 
conflict as different groups sought to exert their power and dominance on the others from the pre-colonial times 
to the present.  
The President of Zimbabwe will not allow the reforms which will bring professionalism in the force but at 
the same time take away his control and authority from the security forces. As purported by (Sharp 2012: 9), 
dictators are not in the business of allowing elections or reforms that could remove them from their thrones. The 
delay in implementing such reforms works to the advantage of the incumbent president.  
Preference for ZANU-PF among the security services has often translated into public declarations of support. 
However, security officials have also often gone well beyond mere public rhetoric by being repeatedly 
implicated in electoral intimidation and manipulation, arbitrary arrest, torture, and the extra-judicial killing of 
regime opponents, especially following the 2008 elections (Muller 2014). The security forces have openly been 
expressing their allegiance to the ruling party. The security forces are now openly involved in campaigning for 
the incumbent president and the ruling party. They directed the operation "Wakavhoterara papi" - meaning where 
did you put your vote in the previous election (Masunungure, Dulani and Braton 2016) (Masunungure 2014). 
The qualification criterion to assume senior government and military positions is that one has to have liberation 
credentials and thus become fit to wield power. As a result, many generals in Zimbabwe continue to support the 
sitting president and ZANU-PF and view security sector reform as a rear guard action by imperialists and other 
enemies of the revolution, such as the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, civil society groups, and a 
variety of international observers. The Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander once made the point very clear, in 
reference to the notion of working with any other political entity by stating that: "We are different. Just like oil 
and water, we cannot mix. As the defence forces we will not respect or entertain people who do not value the 
ideals of the liberation struggle…anyone can make us turn our back on the ideals of the liberation 
struggle"(Muller 2014: 4).  
One other Major-General from the Zimbabwe Defence forces also declared openly that; "Society must 
understand that the land reform and the indigenisation programs are part of our revolutionary history. As the 
military, we do not only believe, but act in defence of these values, and we will not respect any leader who does 
not respect the revolution. We will not even allow them to go into the office because they do not represent the 
ideology we fought for. As the military establishment, we have an ideology that is represented in the mission of 
ZANU-PF (Muller 2014: 3). This scenario justifies the need for training among the security forces themselves to 
understand their professional responsibilities.  
Zimbabwe has a complex security sector that emerged from a fusion of former militants in the war of 
liberation, namely the Rhodesia security forces, Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army and Zimbabwe 
National Liberation Army. Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe is therefore largely influenced not just by the 
dynamics of the post-Cold War politics but also by the legacy of the armed liberation struggle and that makes the 
whole issue very multifaceted (Hendricks and Hutton 2009).  
The need for Security Sector Reforms became especially manifest following ZANU-PF's loss of a 
constitutional referendum in 2000, after which the security services have all come to overtly align themselves 
with President Mugabe and his political party. The leadership of the military, police and Central Intelligence 
Organization was all appointed by the president of the country and made little effort to hide their preference for 
or support of him as president. In December 2012, for example, leaders of Zimbabwe's security forces, including 
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the army and air force commanders, the police commissioner, and head of prisons, all attended a ZANU-PF party 
conference, an act which compromised the professional integrity of the security sector as a whole.  
The prospects of reforming the country’s security sector now appear very desolate. The best time for 
security sector reform was the post-2008 election violence, in which the security services were heavily caught up. 
There was a lot of discontentment in the sector and as such, reforms could have been met with very little 
resistance. However, the power-sharing Government of National Unity that resulted from the post-election 
political deadlock allowed the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front to retain control of all 
security assortments and as such derail all the possibilities of reforms in the security sector (Nyakudya 2014: 1). 
After the hastily called elections in August of 2013, President Mugabe and ZANU-PF were able to regain 
absolute control of the government, pushing the opposition parties out of the GNU. As stated by (Muller 2014), 
the talks of reform have all but disappeared behind a series of deeply entrenched interests, ideology, and a 
general sense of political dissatisfaction.  
The phase of Zimbabwean history from the pre-colonial era was characterized by series of violent acts. The 
advent of colonialism brought in a colonial state that was to enjoy 90 years of domination built on superior 
military might. The colonial state perpetrated violent deprivations of livestock and land, relocation of the 
dispossessed people to marginalized lands, brutal exploitation of African labour and entrenched racial 
discrimination.  
The truth of the matter is that the security sector reforms that are being referred to are aimed at the 
transformation of the security services that will eliminate bias, unprofessionalism, and partisanship. That 
scenario would entail reorientation and re-education on their constitutional obligations and such reforms would 
ensure the military is not used as "a private militia" by ZANU-PF or any other party in future. That is why these 
reforms are crucial and must be implemented as a matter of urgency.  
The security services are determined to ensure their centrality to Zimbabwe's political and economic life and 
have entangled themselves in a symbiotic relationship with the ruling party. For now, ZANU-PF needs the 
military to maintain political pre-eminence and repress the opposition, while the military needs ZANU-PF to 
ensure its place of economic privilege and protect it from prosecution. So long as this synergy remains in effect, 
the security sector reform project in Zimbabwe will likely remain stalled (Nyakudya 2014).  
It is unclear what the security services would do if the sitting president died in office or tried to hand power 
to a successor, especially one they didn’t believe would safeguard their interests? Until the security sector is 
reformed and an appropriate relationship with the civilian government is made, the future of security governance 
in Zimbabwe will remain under a dark shadow (Muller 2014: 2). The other disturbing feature is that the regime 
is not paying heed to constitutional, legal barriers, judicial decisions, and even the public opinion and this leaves 
the populace more hopeless than before. 
 
6. Strategic Plan on the nonviolent action to security sector reforms  
There is the need to train and educate both the security personnel and the ordinary citizens in issues of 
governance, security sector reforms and the dangers of authoritarian rule (Sharp 2013). The importance of such 
training is that it eradicates the fear which the ordinary people have to the military and other security agents. 
Education will inculcate integration among the civilians and the security personnel to have a different perception 
of whether they view each other in the democratic arena equal partners. All the issues of misconception 
discussed in this paper will be demystified through proper training and education in this regard. This kind of 
training might also enlighten both parties to see whether they are properly carrying out their duties or being used 
to full fill leadership's selfish and continuous grip on power. So instead of hurriedly pushing for security sector 
reform, there is the need for aggressive training and education which clearly articulates the importance of this 
global initiative (Sharp 2012). The training must clarify on the continuous significance between the liberation 
struggle and the security sector reform. It has to come out clean that it will not eradicate that part of the history.  
People tend to value their cultures and this has remained in their mind-sets and the practice is passed on to 
the next generations. In order for security forces to change the way they view themselves and the nexus between 
them and the ruling party, demonstrates the need to transform their mind-sets through intensive training or 
education on sector reform. This kind of training will eradicate the wrong misconceptions that they have about 
this noble cause of security sector reforms. Though this initiate sounds long-term, it will in dealing with this 
delicate group without endangering anyone’s life. Therefore, there is a need for transformative peacebuilding 
initiatives among the security personnel which will empower them to be able to distinguish facts from fallacies 
and thus in the process allow the democratic process to unfold without any impediments.  
There is a strong call for partnership with the media in promoting the concept of security sector reforms 
(Sharp 2003). The current situation would need legal statutory instruments like AIPA to be revisited first before 
any call on security reforms could be made. The media plays a very crucial role in aiding the success of any 
nonviolent campaign. The social media platforms should be used to mobilize people to embrace this noble 
initiative. The issues of governance and the rule of law which are key to the implementation of Security sector 
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reforms should be openly highlighted. As long as this space is polarized and used as a propaganda tool by the 
ruling party and government, it will be very difficult to make a breakthrough in the implementation of such 
desired reforms.   
 
7. Economic performance        
Whilst Zimbabwe might need a political solution to dislodge President Robert Mugabe from power there is 
need for contingency planning on the economic front to ensure sustainable peace and economic recovery. The 
key contributors to Zimbabwe’s failing economy are mainly corruption, unfriendly policies and legislation as 
well as policy inconsistency. Zimbabwe’s situation is peculiar is that unlike in most cases where countries 
experience an economic collapse during wartime there is no war in the country. The economy has shrunk by 
more than two thirds, which is worse than the levels attained in wartime Cambodia.  
The government of Zimbabwe enacted policies and legislation that have contributed to the demise of the 
economy instead of reviving it. Chief amongst them are the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 enacted in 1992 
and the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act Chapter 14:33 Act 14/2007 enacted in 2008. The 
former enabled land redistribution to take place and this, unfortunately, was done in ways that led to the 
destruction of the agricultural sector. The latter advocated for businesses valued at a certain threshold to 
relinquish 51% of their company shares to indigenous people. This resulted in capital flight and failure by the 
country to attract meaningful foreign direct investment.  
The revenue starved government, which is failing to pay its civil service on time, has also enacted revenue 
collection policies and mechanisms that are heavily taxing its citizens. These revenue collection mechanisms are 
not only being used as the government’s source of income but they are also propping up the regime through 
illicit revenue flows. For example, the Zimbabwe Republic Police collects spot fines but does not retire the 
money to Treasury (Nemukuyu 2015). Resultantly there are high levels of corruption as people try to pay their 
way around paying the high taxes, tariffs or fines imposed on them. There have been shocking revelations of 
illicit revenue flows with the government losing more than US$13billion from illegal diamond trading (Bwititi 
2016).  
Zimbabwe has been under targeted sanctions since 2003 (Grebe 2010; Chipanga and Mude 2015). Whilst 
these sanctions were meant to force the hand of the ruling party and its leadership to undertake reforms in the 
democratic space and on human rights preservation they have not succeeded completely. Instead the sanctions 
discourse has been used by the government as part of the reasons for the protracted economic failure (Chingono 
2010; Masaka 2012). The government has failed to acknowledge the failure of its policies and custodianship 
over the economy.  
 
8. Strategic Plan on the nonviolent action to economic performance 
In order to address the social and economic injustice the nonviolent action should be targeted at rebuilding 
investor confidence whilst halting the illicit flow of revenue as well as tackling the source that is financing the 
oppressive government. Out of the 38 possible economic related non-violent actions proposed by Sharp (2003) 
the following are applicable in Zimbabwe’s context: consumers’ boycott; non-consumption of boycotted goods; 
rent withholding; refusal to rent; national consumers’ boycott; suppliers’ and handlers’ boycott; traders’ boycott; 
refusal to let or sell property; lockout; withdrawal of bank deposits; refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments; 
revenue refusal; selective patronage; alternative markets and market places; alternative transportation systems; 
and alternative economic institutions.  
Whatever action that Zimbabwean movements decide to adopt these should directly fight corruption and 
rebuild investor confidence; resist oppressive fines, tariffs and price hikes to public services like electricity; 
resist the payment of taxes and levies; and boycott services and products of businesses run by ZANU (PF) 
supporters or activists.  
The following is the strategic plan for economic related nonviolent action. The goal of this action will be to 
fight corruption and rebuild investor confidence. The same plan can be used for other goals such as 
haemorrhaging the regime’s financial supply line:  
Goal: To reduce corruption and rebuild investor confidences whilst cutting off the oppressive government’s 
financial supply line.  
The activities that will be carried out in order to achieve the set goal can include any of the following actions; 
(i) community mobilisation and anti-corruption awareness campaigns, (ii) non-payment of taxes or tariffs, (iii) 
naming and shaming of corrupt officials and ministers and (iv) messages sensitising people on what public 
service any generated revenue could have been used for.  
The following are the means through which the above activities will be undertaken: billboards; pamphlets; 
social media; road shows; marches and pickets outside parastatal offices; and work with law enforcement in 
disguise.  
A movement will need to have access to the following resources in order to successfully implement the 
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strategy: the people’s cultural values that promote non-violence; communication skills and equipment; training 
and workshops facilitators; hidden cameras; money to cover transportation and billboard rentals; printed material; 
bail money; legal representation; and safe havens.  
For non-violent action to succeed the movement undertaking it needs to clearly assess its opponent’s weak 
points. The following are the vulnerabilities of Zimbabwe’s ruling party which can be exploited to a movement’s 
advantage: factionalism; vulnerability to civilian resistance; discontent and overtaxed citizens; and irregularly 
paid civil servants 
 
9. Conclusion  
We conclude that Zimbabwe finds itself at a crossroad where critical choices need to be made. One where 
the government is performing at its worst and the ruling party is rocked with infighting and factionalism. People 
have to decide on what action they need to take so as to end the injustices they have become so accustomed to. A 
very plausible option is to embark on the civilian-based resistance route. Nonviolent action has, in some 
countries, brought an end to repressive governments and it could be the realistic alternative to Zimbabwe’s 
conflict. However, non-violent action needs to be accompanied with strong strategic thinking and 
communication skills. It will also require a lot of community mobilisation and training. Ordinary citizens need to 
be skilled on how to act non-violently when faced up with a violent reaction to their demands. Organisers will 
need to set up contingency plans and funds in case arrests and abductions take place.  
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